This standard was so strict that Nelson Mandela was originally excluded from advocacy by the organization. Thus, it does not matter so very much what they do, so long as they do something. And by definition the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is wide. In accordance with this vision, and more importantly — to stay relevant — Amnesty, like Human Rights Watch and other similar groups, broadened the menu of issues on which it claims expertise.
It also opposes the imprisonment of people imprisoned by reason of their ethnic origin, sex, colour or language, who neither use nor advocate violence. To call these detainees prisoners of conscience, as Amnesty International does, is highly artificial. Amnesty continued to expand its scope as an organization as additional types of human rights violations were defined. This helped keep Amnesty relevant, but also had negative aspects.
First, Amnesty faced resistance from grassroots members, especially with regards to its stance on the death penalty. Covering a large number of new areas would have meant diluting its work, and its effectiveness in what Amnesty International did. This problem was largely bureaucratic. There grew up a group of mandate technicians who knew and argued about the finer points of the mandate.
There arose mandate historians, mandate lawyers and mandate political trends within the movement. Amnesty went to great lengths to spin off the mandate from the Statute, without amending the actual Statute. Amnesty International has been defining vague words in its statute with gusto. Indeed Amnesty had an Alice in Wonderland attitude to its statute.
Words in the statute have not had their ordinary everyday meaning. They meant what Amnesty International said they meant. And the decision about what the words in the statute meant could change and did change from one International Council Meeting to another. Because of this, thousands of Amnesty members and most employees throughout the world were unable to say precisely what Amnesty actually did.
The narrow set of goals created a situation where energies and resources were channeled directly to the problems at hand. The expansion demanded fair trials in a reasonable time for prisoners held on political grounds. In the expansion demanded an end to extrajudicial killings for political reasons extended in to demand an end to all extrajudicial killings.
Even then, insiders were concerned that the issue took Amnesty too far afield of its original mandate. This expansion brings into focus a classic problem with human rights organizations: while states can sign and violate international treaties, and be subjected to international law, non-state actors terrorist groups, rebel groups, paramilitaries, criminal groups, etc. Despite these additions, the mandate was relatively specific, and Amnesty still focused on prisoner issues: prisoners of conscience, death penalty, and torture.
Eventually, however, pressure grew from membership to change and expand the mandate. Such a transition, from a specific to general a mandate, would considerably change how Amnesty functioned. During the early s, the limitations of a narrow approach dominated. However, as the Cold War faded and the number of prisoners of conscience declined, new sources of influence and rationales for raising funds became an organizational necessity.
Amnesty had to redefine itself. Although this was sometimes discussed, it [had] always rejected to take on the full spectrum of human rights or to deal more specifically with aspects of economic, social and cultural rights, as suggested by friendly critics. The meeting also highlighted the unique place of Arab-Israeli politics within the Amnesty landscape. One of the most pressing issues, unrelated to Israel per se, was whether or not to define those jailed for homosexuality as prisoners of conscience.
However, another set of issues became important at the meeting —house demolitions, deportation, and administrative detention — that is, allegations frequently lodged against Israel.
These three issues were packaged together with sexual orientation in a blanket clause for acceptance during the meeting, and it passed. It was deference to this rejection under the name of multiculturalism that motivated many more delegates.
Amnesty also began to prioritize issues based on what would drive its member base instead of objective human rights standards. Starting in , Amnesty officially focused on countries and popular issues that would increase the possibility of organizational impact leading to more members by prioritizing its mandate resolutions.
Not only did member groups need to get a resolution passed, they also had to secure for it a high priority. Supply rises with demand; the more journalists who ask about a country, the more information watchdogs will supply.
With few journalists urgently demanding information about Niger, it ma[kes] little sense to invest substantial reporting and advocacy resources there. Another issue Amnesty faced at its meeting, was the problem of what standards to use to condemn actors in internal conflicts. It decided to use International Humanitarian Law IHL as its basis of criticism of both governments and nongovernmental groups.
The Integrated Strategic Plan for noted three key trends: state authority was weakening, entities other than governments were violating human rights, and internal conflicts were making it more difficult to determine blame.
The status quo was indefensible. It was so befuddling that it had ceased to be an option. The mandate had become so layered and complex that no one could reel it off without referring to notes. The general decision in was that Amnesty would go for a full spectrum approach—opposing all violations of human rights—though the transition was intended to move gradually. At the International Council meeting, the mandate was replaced with a mission.
This change did little to improve functionality on the ground. When AI worked under a mandate, getting AI to oppose any particular abuse involved three steps — getting opposition to the abuse into the mandate; getting opposition to the abuse into the strategic plan; and giving opposition to the abuse a high priority in the strategic plan.
Now that AI works under a mission, getting AI to oppose any particular abuse also involves three steps, albeit three different steps — getting opposition to the abuse into the strategic plan; getting opposition to the abuse into the operational plan; and giving opposition to the abuse a high priority in the operational plan.
For example:. In its early years, Amnesty was an effective human rights organization characterized by clarity of purpose and focused on prisoner of conscience release. In contrast, its current mission attempts to tackle the entire universe of human rights violations. Amnesty International is a world-embracing movement working for the protection of human rights. It is independent of all governments and is neutral in its relation to political groups, ideologies and religious dividing lines.
The movement works for the release of women and men who have been arrested for their convictions, the colour of their skin, their ethnic origin or their faith — provided that they have not themselves used force or exhorted others to resort to violence.
To begin with, Amnesty International was a British organization, but in an international secretariat was established. Ten years after its foundation the organization comprised more than voluntary groups in 28 countries and the figures are steadily rising.
In February this year there were groups in 33 countries. In the statutes adopted by the organization in these three tasks are named as the most important ones for Amnesty International. Power, Jonathan. Amnesty International. The Human Rights Story. New York: McGraw Hill, Well-illustrated journalistic account. This text was first published in the book series Les Prix Nobel. It was later edited and republished in Nobel Lectures.
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